UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23205
11 November 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter of 29 October 1991 (S/23186) relating to the composition of the military component of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), I have the honour to propose that Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France) be appointed as Senior Military Liaison Officer of UNAMIC.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR

91-37960 3436a (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23206
11 November 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 8 November 1991 (S/23205) concerning the appointment of the Senior Military Liaison Officer of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) has been brought to the attention of the Council members. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Aurel Dragos MUNTEANU
President of the Security Council

91-37966 2758g (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23207
11 November 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to propose that, subject to the approval of the Security Council at the appropriate time, Major-General John M. Sanderson (Australia) should be appointed as Commander of the military component of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) after it has been established by the Security Council. I further propose that Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France) should serve as Deputy Commander.

In the meantime, it is my intention to associate General Sanderson closely in a senior advisory capacity in the preparatory process relating to the military mandate of UNTAC.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Council.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR

91-37972 2627c (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23208
11 November 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 8 November 1991 (S/23207) concerning the appointment of the Commander and the Deputy Commander of the military component of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has been brought to the attention of the Council members. They welcome the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Aurel-Dragos MUNTEANU
President of the Security Council

91-37978 2685i (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23209
11 November 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our previous letters concerning the Kuwaiti side's violations of the cease-fire between Iraq and Kuwait, I wish to inform you of fresh occurrences of Kuwaiti violations, as follows:

1. At 0930 hours on 26 October 1991, two aircraft coming from Kuwaiti airspace violated Iraqi airspace over the Safwan area.

2. At 1310 hours on 2 November 1991, a warplane coming from Kuwaiti airspace in the direction of Safwan at a high altitude and at medium speed violated Iraqi airspace.

3. At 1200 hours on 2 November 1991, the Kuwaiti side's forces abducted a number of Iraqi policemen, whose names are given below and who were working in the border police forces in the demilitarized zone. The abducted men were travelling in an IFA vehicle, carrying rations, on the Rajjah road in the direction of the Iraqi Talhah border control post at geographical coordinate 4332. The Kuwaiti side's forces have sc far not returned them:

(a) Captain Jawad Kazim Safa'

(b) Commissioner Basil Hamid Fajr

(c) Commissioner Sami Mahmud Taha

(d) Commissioner Mubahil Abd al-Majid

(e) Commissioner Salih Jabr Jiyad

(f) Sergeant Ali Huwaydi Muhammad

(g) Sergeant Riyad Zaki Hamzah

(h) Corporal Basil Kazim Hamd

(i) PFC Khudayr Abbas

(j) PFC Adnan Jabbar

(k) PFC Adil Radi Khirrij

(l) PFC Sabah Za'nun

4. On 2 November 1991, the Kuwaiti side's forces abducted Commissioner Halus Mahall Hasan, who was working in the border police forces, as he was travelling from the Talhah control post in the direction of geographical coordinate 3446. They have so far not returned him.

5. At 1715 hours on 3 November 1991, four Kuwaiti naval targets were observed close to Mina al-Bakr. They are still there.

These actions by the Kuwaiti side constitute a clear and unequivocal violation of the cease-fire provisions laid down in Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in the report of the Secretary-General in which he defined the mandate of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). They also constitute a blatant challenge to the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter because they infringe on the sovereignty of a State Member of the Organization.

In registering its strong protest at these violations, my Government vehemently condemns the Kuwaiti Government for its forces' violation of Iraqi territorial integrity and sovereignty, which is deemed proof of the insincerity of its intentions with regard to the establishment of peace with Iraq, calls upon it to desist from its violations of the provisions of the cease-fire between the two countries and holds it fully responsible for the safety of the lives of the Iraqi citizens detained by its authorities and for guaranteeing their immediate return to their country, Iraq.

In informing you of these violations, I request you to intervene and to take such adequate and appropriate measures as are dictated by the provisions and principles of the Charter of the Organization to guarantee the return of the Iraqi citizens detained by the Kuwaiti authorities to Iraq, to put a halt to these violations and to prevent any repetition in the future.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23210
11 November 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government I wish to inform you of the following.

On 10 October 1991, at 1740 local time, Kuwaiti patrol boats, on a routine mission in Kuwaiti territorial waters, detected seven objects on the radar, north-east of Failaka island, at 48° 25' E, 30° 45' N. The Kuwaiti patrol approached its target, which turned out to be seven fishing boats with 55 Iraqis. They admitted that they were aware of being in Kuwaiti territorial waters but believed they would not be detected. Investigation also uncovered that some of the boats utilized by the Iraqis belong to Kuwaiti nationals from whom the boats were seized during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

On 26 October 1991, all 55 infiltrators were returned to Iraq under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Kuwait.

On 18 October 1991, at 1345 local time, a Kuwaiti police patrol west of Al-Abdeli near the former refugee camp spotted three individuals who parked their cars near Iraqi farms and proceeded south towards ditches inside Kuwaiti territory, ostensibly to collect ammunition. The Kuwaiti patrol apprehended two of the Iraqi infiltrators while the third, failing to heed warning, fled after being shot in the leg. Subsequently, the two were returned to Iraq.

The responsibility of the Iraqi regime for repeated incidents of infiltration into Kuwaiti territory cannot be ignored, especially in the light of the regime's encouragement to scavengers for arms in return for financial rewards. Iraqi actions and inactions towards these infiltration incidents is yet another proof of the regime's intransigence and lack of commitment to the Security Council resolutions.

I would appreciate it if the present letter could be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/46/644
S/23211
12 November 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 35
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 11 November 1991 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and with reference to my earlier letters, in particular the letter dated 30 May 1991 circulated as document A/46/207-S/22654, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

Even as the international community redoubles its efforts to establish an equitable and comprehensive peace in the Middle East on the basis of the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations, in particular Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and with the Madrid peace conference hardly concluded, the Israeli Minister of Agriculture, Rafael Aitan, accompanied by the Israeli Minister of Housing, Ariel Sharon, was inaugurating a new settlement in the occupied Syrian Golan which has been given the name of Kilaa and is in principle to be settled by 70 families of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union. In the speech which he gave on this occasion, the Israeli Minister of Housing, Sharon, called for the expansion of the Jewish population in the Golan in order to ensure its control by Israel.

It is clear that this action by Israel constitutes a new and serious violation of the resolutions of the United Nations, in particular Security Council resolutions 465 (1980) and 497 (1981), and provides further confirmation of Israel's intention to maintain its annexation of the occupied Syrian Golan and to impose this solution by means of a demographic, economic and social fait accompli in pursuit of its colonizing and expansionist policy. Furthermore, these actions also constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, in particular its article 49.

The fact that Israel's establishment of a new settlement at Kilaa in the occupied Syrian Golan and the statements made by the Israeli Minister of Housing, Sharon, have coincided with the holding of the Madrid peace conference reaffirms yet again Israel's true intentions of maintaining its occupation and carrying out its expansionist plans at the expense of the Arab territories, even though such actions hinder international peace efforts. This point was made by Mr. James Baker, Secretary of State of the United States of America and one of the sponsors of the peace conference, in his comments on the establishment of the new Kilaa settlement, when he said that the United States found it difficult to understand how the establishment of a new settlement could contribute to the peace process at this time. Similarly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, commenting on the establishment of the new settlement in statements made for Spanish television on 6 November 1991, appealed to Israel to suspend its colonization of the occupied Arab territories and not to jeopardize the Middle East peace talks.

As of today, 13,400 Jewish settlers have installed themselves in the occupied Syrian Golan, while the number of settlements established by the occupying Power, Israel, totals 43. Israel's policy of continuing to establish settlements in the occupied Arab territories reveals yet again its determination to defy international legality and the international community and its lack of interest in fostering a suitable atmosphere for serious progress in the process of establishing an equitable and comprehensive peace in the Middle East and for compliance with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the other resolutions of the United Nations pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the resolutions of the United Nations must be complied with and implemented and that international legality must be respected, for the observance of those fundamental principles has now come to be a legitimate international demand and even a characteristic and dominant feature of international relations. Today there is no doubt that the international community is capable of bringing this legality fully to bear on any State which violates it. Failure to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations constitutes a violation of international legality; accordingly the United Nations must now deal with this violation by taking the vigorous action which the situation demands.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Issa AWAD
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23212
12 November 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 12 November 1991 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. It concerns the articles published by the British weekly newspaper The Independent on Sunday on a report prepared by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency in April 1991 on the use by coalition forces during the Gulf war of anti-tank shells fabricated from depleted uranium, a material that contains chemical toxins and radioactive materials that portend a wide-scale human and environmental disaster.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 12 November 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose with this letter copies of the articles published by the British weekly newspaper The Independent on Sunday in its issue for Sunday, 10 November 1991, in which is brought to light important information contained in a report prepared by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency (AEA) in April 1991 on the use by coalition forces during the Gulf war of anti-tank shells fabricated from depleted uranium, which contains chemical toxins and radioactive materials that portend a wide-scale human and environmental disaster.

Based on the AEA report, the newspaper states that tens of thousands of armour-piercing rounds manufactured from depleted uranium (U-238) were fired at Iraqi vehicles from American and British aircraft and tanks and that the chemically toxic and radioactive waste that was emitted by the shells and is still being emitted by their remnants poses a long-term threat to the lives of thousands of people.

Referring to the report, the newspaper states that United States tanks fired 5,000 depleted uranium rounds against Iraqi vehicles and that United States aircraft fired tens of thousands of such rounds. The tank ammunition alone would contain more than 50,000 pounds of depleted uranium - enough radioactive material, according to International Commission on Radiological Protection risk estimates, to cause 500,000 deaths. The newspaper says nothing of estimates of the numbers of people whose lives are threatened by the radiation produced by the tens of thousands of such rounds fired by United States aircraft on the cities, villages and townships of Iraq during 42 days of intensive raids, but it must surely be double that number.

This momentous revelation constitutes a new increment in the United States crimes being exposed day after day - the most recent but not the last of which was that of the live burial of thousands of Iraqi soldiers - and it provides additional proof of the violation by the United States of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, The Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and the laws of armed conflict. It is one of the ironies of fate that the United States should be making use of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security Council as a cloak for the perpetration of its crimes against the people of Iraq and the peoples and environment of the region.

We call upon you to dispatch a team of United Nations experts to study the proportions of this human and environmental disaster and to identify ways to remedy it. Through you, we further call upon all States, political, humanitarian and environmental organizations and international public opinion

to raise their voices in condemnation of this crime and in an appeal for the immediate lifting of the despotic economic embargo imposed on the people of Iraq so that that people may make use of its resources in order to contain the immediate and long-term effects of the United States crimes committed against it.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

Baghdad, 12 November 1991

Annex

10 NOVEMBER 1991 THE INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY

No action taken after secret report warning of health threat to Kuwaitis and clean-up teams from West

Radioactive waste left in Gulf by allies

By Nick Cohen

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THE ALLIED armies left at least 40 tons of depleted uranium on the Gulf war battlefield, a secret report by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority has warned. The chemically toxic and radioactive waste threatens the long-term health of thousands of Kuwaitis, as well as Western clean-up teams. It could also pass into the food chain and water supply.

The uranium was in tens of thousands of armour-piercing rounds fired at Iraqi vehicles from American aircraft and British and US tanks during the conflict.

An AEA appraisal of the threat, which has been seen by *The Independent on Sunday*, calculates that there is easily enough uranium in Kuwait and southern Iraq to cause "500,000 potential deaths".

The authority says that this is a purely theoretical calculation, which is "obviously not realistic". However, it adds that the sheer volume of depleted uranium does "indicate a significant problem".

The report was prepared in April by decommissioning and decontamination specialists working for AEA Technology, the commercial arm of the atomic authority, at the Winfrith Establishment, Dorset. The authority offered then to send "a small and dedicated team" to the Gulf "in total confidentiality". It wanted to identify the size of the problem and devise a clean-up plan. The worst concentrations of depleted uranium could then be removed and potential health hazards minimised. But, after six months, no action has been taken by the British government or by Royal Ordnance, the privatised Ministry of Defence munitions supplier responsible for clearing the British sector of the Gulf war battlefield.

"Discussions are continuing with various parties," a senior AEA official said last week. "They have not gone as quickly as we would have hoped." The authority has so far failed to get the go-ahead despite warning that expert assistance was needed because depleted uranium "requires sensitive equipment and well-trained operators as it is difficult to locate".

An appeal to political self-interest has also failed. The report said: "A further concern is a political one of leaving significant quantities of uranium around Kuwait. The problem will not go away and should be tackled before it becomes a political problem created by the environmental lobby. It is in both the Kuwait and the UK interest that this is not left to rear its head in years to come."

The report was sent to Royal Ordnance and unspecified British government departments. The Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office denied any knowledge of its contents. A spokesman for Royal Ordnance, which has about 250 sappers clearing mines in the desert, was unable at the time the company was contacted to say whether the company had received the report, as was a spokesman for the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence.

The AEA would not say whether the Kuwaitis had been told. At the time the report was produced no decision had been made on whether to inform the Kuwaitis, who have passed responsibility for clearing the battlefield to contractors from the allied powers. The issue of whether the Kuwaiti government needed to know was described earlier this year as "delicate".

Delays in acting on the report are understood to be the result of problems in co-ordinating the response between the various clean-up teams in the different allied sectors and the fact that much of the waste lies in Iraqi territory.

The Atomic Energy Authority believes some of the waste could still be properly and safely cleared if a decision can be made soon.

The AEA said in April the best estimates were that US tanks fired 5,000 depleted uranium rounds, US aircraft many tens of thousands of rounds, and British tanks "a small number". The tank ammunition alone would contain more than 50,000lb of depleted uranium — enough radioactive material, on International Committee of Radiological Protection risk estimates, to cause "500,000 potential deaths" if it were inhaled, the report says.

This figure bears no relation to real hazards because for half a million to die, the uranium shells would have to be pulverised into dust and 500,000 people would have to line up in the desert and inhale equal quantities.

The AEA says that the real danger comes from uranium dust produced when depleted uranium shells have hit and burned out Iraqi armoured vehicles. If airborne particles are inhaled they can lead to "unacceptable body burdens".

The depleted uranium will be "spread around the battlefield and target vehicles in varying sizes from dust particles to full-size penetrators", the report says. "It would be unwise for people to stay close to large quantities of DU for long periods and this would obviously be of concern to the local population if they collect this heavy metal and keep it.

"There will be specific areas in which many rounds will have been fired where localised contamination of vehicles and the soil may exceed permissible limits and these could be hazardous to both clean-up teams and the local population. Furthermore if DU gets in the food chain or water this will create potential health problems."

Further reports, page 2

6. The DU will be spread around the battlefield and target vehicles in varying sizes and quantities from dust particles to full size penetrators and shot. It would be unwise for people to stay close to large quantities of DU for long periods and this would obviously be of concern to the local population if they collect this heavy metal and keep it. There will be specific areas in which many rounds will have been fired where localised contamination of vehicles and the soil may exceed permissible limits and these could be hazardous to both clean up teams and the local population.

Hazards of war: extracts from the confidential report by the UK Atomic Energy Authority

7. A further concern is a political one of leaving significant quantities of uranium around Kuwait. The problem will not go away and should be tackled before it becomes a political problem created by the environmental lobby. It is in both the Kuwait and the UK interest that this is not left to rear its head in the years to come.

Gulf teams not told of risk from uranium

By Nick Cohen and Tom Wilkie

SOLDIERS, mine-clearing experts and reconstruction workers in Kuwait have not received the Atomic Energy Authority report on the health risks posed by depleted uranium ammunition left lying on the Gulf war battlefield by British and American forces.

The amount of uranium used in the Gulf war theatre made it very likely that there would be contaminated areas with large amounts of uranium dust, the authority said in April. Given the conditions in Kuwait, internationally-recognised uranium dosage limits "could easily be exceeded if special arrangements are not made," it predicted.

Gulf in June said they had never received any instructions from the Royal Ordnance project managers on what to do if they encountered depleted uranium.

Even if safety guidelines have been issued subsequently, the Atomic Energy Authority report points out that untrained workers in a contaminated area may not recognise depleted uranium when they meet it.

The authority's six-month-old proposal, still to be accepted, warned that qualified operators

poisonous, like all heavy metals, and its effect was similar to that of lead, he said.

If there is uranium dust around, it is easily kicked up into the air and then people can breathe it into their lungs. The maximum permissible body burden depends on the chemical form of the uranium: some compounds of uranium are cleared from the body within a matter of days; others may reside within the body for years. For the long-residing compounds, the maximum permissible body burden is 600 becquerels — 16 billionths of a Curie — equivalent to 16 billionths of a gram of radium. The

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No action has been taken on the report and last week the Ministry of Defence, which had a squadron of Royal Engineers working on battlefield mine clearance and the removal of military equipment in Kuwait for four months this summer with Royal Ordnance, said it was "not aware" of the calls for experts to be brought in to identify and minimise health and environmental risks.

Royal Ordnance, the privatised munitions company which is under contract to the Kuwait government to clear mines and cluster-bombs from the beaches and deserts south of Kuwait City, said that it did know that there were potential dangers. The staff it had hired were under instructions to take proper precautions and wear gloves and protective clothing when they came across depleted uranium.

But former Royal Ordnance employees who returned from the and sensitive equipment were needed as the uranium would be "difficult to locate".

The largest Western contractor in the Gulf – Bechtel, a US engineering and management consultancy company, which has 1,000 employees and 9,000 subcontractors on reconstruction work in Kuwait – was unable to say if it had received any warnings about depleted uranium.

Many – perhaps most – of the uranium rounds in the desert will be in large fragments and not particularly menacing. Risks arise where they have been broken up after smashing into Iraqi armour.

Dr Roger Berry, director of health and safety at British Nuclear Fuels, said that it was the chemical toxicity of uranium rather than its mild radioactivity which posed a threat.

"The big problem is dust," Dr Berry said, "and the main route [into the body] is inhalation." Uranium is a heavy metal and is more permissive limits would allow the equivalent of 160 billionths of a gram of radium.

The body has natural mechanisms for purging such heavy metals, transferring the uranium to the kidneys and then excreting it through the urine. But too much uranium taken up at once will cause kidney failure.

Dr Berry emphasised that he had no direct knowledge of the amounts or type of uranium that might be present as a result of the use of tank-busting shells in the Gulf war, but said the main worry would be dust produced after the shells impacted.

"If it's all retained inside the tanks then there would be no environmental pollution problem." But, Dr Berry said, depending on the chemical composition of the uranium inside the tanks, he would expect that personnel dismantling them would have to be protected by respirators, or at least commercial dust masks.

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'Arrow' that can stop a tank

By Christopher Bellamy
Defence Correspondent

AN ENGLISH archer at Agincourt would have had no problem understanding the principles behind a depleted uranium anti-tank round. To penetrate armour, you want a small, hard, dense, sharp head, driven by the power of a much larger device — a longbow, or a tank gun.

Depleted uranium — U-238 — is extremely hard and dense, even more so than the tungsten alloy which is also used for solid armour-piercing shot. Because of this property, it is also used for protection, in the armour of the US M1A1 tank.



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
How depleted uranium ammunition works
Fin
Body
Sabot
Depleted uranium penetrator
US 105mm M833 anti-tank round
Tank armour
Sabot falls from shell as it leaves gun barrel
After penetrating armour, fragments fly off hitting equipment or men in tank. Dust particles catch fire burning and suffocating crew

Graphic: Michael Rosove

The core of a DU round is the penetrator — an armour-piercing arrow, much like those shot at Agincourt in 1415. It even has fins or flights at the back to stabilise it.

The penetrator is wrapped in a "sabot" (from the French for clog) which fills the bore of the gun and imparts enormous energy. But after it leaves the barrel, the sabot is kicked off and the thin, hard core carries on. Even if the gun is rifled, the spiralling grooves will only impart spin to the sabot. So the fins are still needed to keep the penetrator stabilised after it has left its cradle. The full name is Armour-Piercing, Fin Stabilised, Discarding Sabot (APFSDS). The smaller DU rounds fired from the A-10 aircraft do not have fins, and are therefore APDS.

When it hits the target, the penetrator punches a hole right through the armour. There were cases in which DU rounds were fired at tanks dug in behind sand berms, and went right through both the berm and the tank. What exactly happens depends on where the round strikes. It may crash into the engine compartment, or fly through the turret, knocking out the gun elevating gear, for example, or it may fragment, killing the crew.

However, DU rounds do behave differently from tungsten. Depleted uranium dust catches fire in air, an effect called "pyrophoretic". As the round bores through the armour and heats up, it gives off dust which, when it catches alight in the crew compartment, can severely burn or kill the occupants. Vehicles hit by DU rounds will be contaminated with DU dust. Incidentally, this helped the Americans confirm that US Marine vehicles destroyed on the southern Kuwaiti border had been hit by "friendly fire", as the Iraqis had no DU ammunition. Rounds which fail to find their mark will just bury themselves in the sand, intact.

US A-10 aircraft never fire DU rounds from their 30mm rapid-firing cannon in peacetime, but it is the standard war ammunition. Many of the 750 rounds on board each A-10 would have been DU. And these would not only have been used during the ground war, from 24 to 28 February, but also throughout the air war against Iraq, which began on 17 January.

British and US tanks also used DU. The British fired fewer than 100 DU rounds; they preferred the High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round which is of more general use. Exploding against the outside of a tank, HESH blasts a scab off the inside armour of the vehicle, with horrific results for the crew.

But the Americans undoubtedly fired many DU tank rounds. The US Marines fired DU rounds from the 105mm guns of their M-60 tanks and the US Army fired it from the 120mm guns of their M1A1s. A Pentagon spokesman said last week that it was impossible to say how much ammunition had been fired during the 100-hour ground battle, let alone what type. "You're not going to get an accurate count. There really wouldn't be any reason. There's quite enough to do without trying to count the number of bullets fired."

UNITED
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S/23213
12 November 1991
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I am pleased to transmit herewith a letter dated 12 November 1991 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning a visit made during the first week of the current month by a United Nations delegation, headed by Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, to Iran for the second time for the purpose of assessing Iran's losses in the Iraq-Iran war.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 12 November 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

We have learned through the information media that, during the first week of the current month, a United Nations delegation, headed by Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, visited Iran for the second time for the purpose of assessing Iran's losses in the Iran-Iraq war, within the framework of the implementation of paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). Before giving my comments on this visit, I wish to reaffirm to you that Iraq has desired and continues to desire the implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987), as a peace plan for the purpose of achieving a just, durable and honourable settlement of the dispute between Iraq and Iran.

As I informed you in my letter dated 26 August 1991, the implementation of resolution 598 (1987) has been suspended, and only the cease-fire has been implemented temporarily. It did not hold because Iran violated the cease-fire and intervened militarily by sending hostile saboteur elements across the frontier to destroy Iraq's cities and sabotage its economic structure, exploiting the circumstances through which Iraq was passing as a result of the aggression to which it was subjected on 17 January 1991. Moreover, the return of all prisoners to their countries has not been effected, and thousands of Iraqi prisoners have been suffering the afflictions of imprisonment for a whole decade, far from their families and dear ones.

Iraq has affirmed on many occasions through the rounds of talks and meetings held at Geneva and New York under your auspices, through the visits of your Personal Representative, Ambassador Jan Eliasson, and through Iraq's declared official position that the fragmentation of resolution 598 (1987) and taking up its paragraphs selectively will not bring the two parties to the dispute to the desired settlement.

We believe that the sending of the above-mentioned mission to Iran in these circumstances and the abrupt transition to paragraph 7 of resolution 598 (1987) will lead to responsiveness to Iran's approach aimed at the fragmentation of the resolution and exploitation of the difficult circumstances through which Iraq is passing, in the hope of transforming the nature of the essential content of paragraph 7 so as to serve the Iranian position on the resolution at the expense of the sound implementation of its provisions.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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LETTER DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF BELGIUM, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to draw your attention to the French and English texts, of a statement on Yugoslavia, adopted by the European Community and its member States at their ministerial meeting held at Noordwijk on 12 November 1991.

We shoud be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of Belgium
to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Bernard P. H. P. MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) Sir David HANNAY
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

Annex

Statement on Yugoslavia

[Original: English/French]

The European Community and its member States condemn the further escalation of attacks upon Vukovar, Dubrovnik and other towns in Croatia.

They have noted that for the first time both the rump Presidency, which consists of representatives of Serbia and Montenegro, and the Government of Croatia, have called for the deployment of international peace-keeping forces in the crisis areas. In response, the Community and its member States have invited Lord Carrington to leave for Yugoslavia without delay in order to explore whether an agreement on such deployment can indeed be reached.

Lord Carrington has been asked to explain to the parties concerned that any deployment of peace-keeping forces will be contingent on the prior establishment of an effective cease-fire.

Member States which are members of the United Nations Security Council have undertaken to accelerate work on additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of the arms embargo and on necessary steps towards imposing an oil embargo. In addition, they will ask the Security Council to consider urgently the implications of the recent proposals from the Yugoslav parties.